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NEW APPROACH NEEDED TO REBUILD BIG THREE UNITY

LONDON, OCT. 6.—The wisest advice to heed during this period of crisis and controversy is that given by Dr. Evatt, Australian Minister of Foreign Affairs, who is emerging as one of the leading statesmen of our times. At his press conference on October 5, he declared that the outcome of the meeting of the Foreign Ministers "is by no means an irreparable setback. On the contrary, it gives a chance, while there is still time, for a new approach to the task of making the peace settlement in a just and democratic manner." Certainly, it would be nothing short of criminal to speak, as some commentators do, of a catastrophe, or assume the inevitability of a head-on collision between the Western powers and Russia.

What was most obviously at fault during the first session of the Council of Foreign Ministers was the procedure decided upon at Potsdam for the drafting of peace treaties. The Potsdam Declaration stated in connection with the drafting of European peace treaties that, "for the discharge of each of these tasks the Council will be composed of the members representing those states which were signatory to the terms of surrender imposed upon the enemy state concerned. For the purpose of the peace settlement for Italy, France shall be regarded as a signatory to the terms of surrender for Italy. Other members will be invited to participate when matters directly concerning them are under discussion." A further clause provided that "whenever the Council is considering a question of direct interest to a state not represented thereon, such state should be invited to send representatives to participate in the discussion and study of that question."

Dr. Evatt, who vigorously fought Russia's interpretation of the veto power at San Francisco and can by no stretch of the imagination be described as pro-Soviet, has justly pointed out that the addition of France and China to the Big Three as members of the

Council of Foreign Ministers followed a wrong analogy. For if it was the intention of the Big Three to model the Council of Foreign Ministers on the Security Council of the United Nations, they should have included not only the five permanent members but also the six non-permanent members, all of which are to be middle or small nations. Moreover, he emphasized a fact which had become lamentably apparent during the London Conference, that the provisions for associating other countries with the proceedings of the Council were vague and imprecise. From the point of view of Russia, the participation of France, which in Moscow's opinion made no important contribution to the defeat of Germany, and of China, which is obviously not a European power, was unnecessary and undesirable.

WIDER DISCUSSION NEEDED. It had been clear since Dumbarton Oaks that Russia expected the Big Three, which are charged with responsibility for keeping the peace, to use the machinery of the United Nations for the purpose of fulfilling their responsibility. This concept of international organization is based on the assumption that the three great powers will take the leadership in making the peace, a leadership which Dr. Evatt declared is undisputed. It is not a democratic concept, if by democracy we understand the equality of all nations, but it had already been accepted by the United States and Britain when they agreed to the use of the veto power.

Yet, as Secretary of State Byrnes broadcast on October 5, no one nation can expect to write the peace in its own way. The problem now, as at San Francisco, is how to temper the great powers' leadership in world affairs by scrutiny and discussion of their decisions at a larger gathering of the United Nations. This has been suggested by Dr. Evatt, who said that as a starting point the Big Three should

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discuss many questions of major principle and policy when they next consider the peace terms. He went on to propose the participation of other states which carried on "sustained belligerence" against the Axis powers and contributed militarily to the defeat of the enemy on whom terms are to be imposed.

Assuming, however, that the Big Three can concur in some such formula as that proposed by Dr. Evatt, many Americans and Britishers here are asking whether it is possible to negotiate with the Russians at all, or whether all hope of an agreed peace settlement with them must be abandoned. The tactics of Mr. Molotov, who on September 11 acquiesced in the participation of France and China, only to repudiate his agreement on September 22, are difficult to justify by any standards acceptable to Western public opinion. British and American negotiators, moreover, have long felt that Mr. Molotov is the most rigid of the Russian leaders, who treats international documents as old Bolsheviks used to treat the party line, allowing no deviation and regarding any opposition to his terms as inspired by sinister motives. Nor can France and China be accused of having tried to embarrass the Big Three, for their representatives were most courteous and self-effacing during the negotiations, and French Foreign Minister Bidault intervened only, as provided by the Potsdam Declaration, in the discussion of the peace treaty with Italy.

MOSCOW FEARS WESTERN BLOC. But certain intangibles cannot be left out of consideration in weighing the results of the London Conference. The Russians, rightly or wrongly, detected a tendency on the part of Britain and the United States to stand to-

gether and of France to side with the Western powers, and have hinted at their fear of a Western bloc. There is no evidence that Washington and London had any preliminary understanding. On the contrary, one of the criticisms of the conference is that the United States and Britain were only sketchily prepared for considering the questions on the agenda. But Russia's suspicions have had the result of bringing them closer together, as well as effecting a rapprochement between them and France which may, in turn, soften its attitude toward the Germans.

Russia still feels isolated at international conferences and fearful that its allies will resume the attitude of hostility current before 1941, since its military aid is no longer needed. That there is considerable justification for Russia's apprehension on this score has been amply demonstrated since V-E Day. But whatever grounds each of the great powers may have for suspecting the others, the grim fact is that, unless the Big Three can agree on the peace treaties, there can be no stabilization in Europe, no withdrawal of Russian troops from satellite countries, and no long-range decisions about the political, economic or social rehabilitation of the continent.

Reports from the continent are unanimous in predicting the worst winter there since 1939. If Europe continues to be the prey of hunger, chaos and despair, the victors will not need to worry much longer about husbanding the fruits of victory. No matter what else may divide the Big Three, a common fear of the results of disagreement should hold them together at future meetings.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

TRUMAN TAKES FIRST STEPS TOWARD CONTROL OF ATOMIC POWER

President Truman's plan for the control and development of atomic energy, given in its bare essentials in his address to Congress on October 3, has opened what must surely prove to be the most crucial debate in this country or any other nation. After a delay of over two months since the first announcement on August 6 that an atomic bomb had been dropped on Hiroshima, Congress has now received proposals for dealing with this revolutionary development, although the President's suggestions on international control of the use and development of atomic power are to be announced more fully in a subsequent message. In a press interview on October 8 Mr. Truman stated that the secret industrial processes involved in releasing atomic energy would not be disclosed to other nations. But he reiterated that he intends to initiate talks, first with Canada and Britain, concerning the terms under which international collaboration and exchange of scientific information might safely proceed. Beyond this the President has offered hope that some kind of international arrangements may be

made to renounce the use and development of atomic energy for war purposes.

AN ALTERED WORLD. At the same time, Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall has laid before the public his review of America's part in the war and his estimate of our future security needs. In sketching the pattern of war in the 20th century, General Marshall's report to the Secretary of War, issued on October 9, pays special attention to the harnessing of atomic power. In these colorful but sober words the Chief of Staff points up the present discussions: "As is obvious from the atomic bomb, the developments of the war have been so incredible that wildest imagination will not project us far from the target in estimating the future. . . . This discovery of American scientists can be man's greatest benefit. And it can destroy him. It is against the latter terrible possibility that this nation must prepare or perish."

Slowly the story of the dramatic production of the atomic bomb is being told. Yet much more factual information about the nature and potentialities of

this new power resource is needed. The dispute as to which Congressional committee should have jurisdiction over any bills introduced for the control of atomic power only emphasizes this need. But all evidence available thus far substantiates the President's view that "a new force too revolutionary to consider in the framework of old ideas" is at hand. If this foreshadows the adoption of internal state controls for the development of atomic energy, it surely can be predicted that the relationships among the world's sovereign states, both large and small, will be altered—and altered drastically. With the possibility of using atomic power the methods of warfare itself will change, and security needs and power relationships reflecting the world situation before August 6 will appear outmoded. Older concepts, like strategic boundaries and bases, land mass and position, will be altered. As barometers of power, even population levels and availability of the traditional basic raw materials may become unimportant. In the not too distant future radically new estimates of the requirements of national security will be necessary. For this reason the recent stalemate reached by the Council of Foreign Ministers in London appears all the more disappointing. For the differences among the Allies which emerged at London arise out of patterns of power politics existing prior to August 6. Jockeying for position either in the Mediterranean or Eastern Europe becomes unimportant if strategic areas themselves pale into insignificance.

PRESENT NEEDS. It is imperative, then, that the United States and other nations take stock of the altered situation now confronting them. Although the argument will continue as to whether this country should disclose the "secret" of the atomic bomb, assurance has been given that the principles of atomic

fission are, or can be, known by all scientists regardless of nationality. It remains, therefore, merely a question of time until production processes like those presently employed, or other new ones, are developed outside the United States. The central question is that of control. That the United States must now make a decision on this score in haste only highlights the crucial nature of the issue. The ramifications of the use of atomic energy both for war or peace are so limitless, however, that nothing less than the creation of a commission with full powers of control, such as President Truman has suggested, will be adequate to frame policy and carry it into operation. In framing this policy the commission should be authorized to consider military defense under the new conditions, the nature of such international controls as are to be devised, the adequacy of attempts to restrict the use of atomic energy as a weapon of war, as well as the implications of the further development of atomic power for peacetime economic pursuits.

While the United States must first clarify its policy on atomic energy, international decisions will doubtless also be necessary with regard to its world control. Perhaps greater authority must now be granted to the United Nations Security Council and its Military Staff Commission. For this reason it may be hoped that the UNO Preparatory Commission now concluding its work in London can arrange for the first meeting of the new organization before the end of the year, as proposed by the United States delegate, Edward R. Stettinius, Jr. Consideration of the problems posed by the use of atomic energy should then be included in the agenda of the first meeting of the United Nations Organization.

GRANT S. McCLELLAN

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State of New York, County of New York, ss.

Before me, a Notary Public in and for the State and county aforesaid, personally appeared Vera Micheles Dean, who, having been duly sworn according to law, deposes and says that she is the Editor of the FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN, and that the following is, to the best of her knowledge and belief, a true statement of the ownership, management, etc., of the aforesaid publication for the date shown in the above caption, required by the Act of August 24, 1912, as amended by the Act of March 3, 1933, embodied in Section 537, Postal Laws and Regulations, printed on the reverse of this form, to wit:

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By VERA MICHELES DEAN, Editor.

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
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Washington News Letter



U.S. BACKS CHUNGKING AGAINST COMMUNISTS IN NORTH CHINA

The arrival of U.S. Marine Corps contingents at Tientsin and near-by points in North China could lead to armed involvement by this country in the long-standing conflict between the forces of the Chinese Central Government and the Communist 8th Route and New 4th armies. The Administration was aware of this possibility when it ordered the Marines into China, where they will back up the United States policy of firmly supporting the central régime headed by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

CHUNGKING AND YENAN VIE FOR SURRENDER. Tientsin lies in an area where both the Central Government and the 8th Route Army claim the right to accept the surrender of Japanese troops, and the Marine commanders have instructions to enforce the order of General Douglas MacArthur designating the Central Government forces as the sole authority. The mere arrival of the Marines might deter the 8th Route Army commanders from pursuing their unauthorized demands, and the Communist spokesmen contemplate their presence with alarm.

"The presence of American troops in Tientsin will actually and inevitably lead to interference in Chinese domestic affairs and inevitably help the Kuomintang to oppose the Chinese Communist Party and 100,000,000 people in the liberated areas," the Communist-operated New China News Agency announced on September 30. Government spokesmen, on the other hand, expressed pleasure at the dispatch of the Marines, who are expected to withdraw when the Central Government has regained authority in the area where they are stationed. "The U.S. landing is a concrete expression of mutual aid and cooperation between the allies in military matters," said the Chungking Army newspaper *Sao Tang Pao* on October 1.

Controversy between the Central Government and the Communists over acceptance of the surrender gives acute expression to the chronic differences between the two groups. The particular issue has been mounting in intensity since August 17, when Communist General Chu Teh sent a memorandum to the American, British and Soviet Ambassadors in Chungking demanding that the Communists participate in the surrender. None of the Ambassadors responded favorably to the demand.

The rivalry over the surrender in northern China—where Communist troops were more active than Government forces during the war—has been partly responsible for occasional armed clashes between troops of the two factions. The New China News

Agency has accused Chiang Kai-shek of using puppet and Japanese forces to combat the 8th Route Army, and information reaching Washington through other channels indicates that both the Central Government and the Communists are trying to attract the puppets to their sides. "On September 20 the Kuomintang troops led the puppet Independent Front Army from Wuhu, Nanling and Fanchang to attack the Hsinkou area in liberated Anhwei," said the New China News Agency on October 2. "The New 4th Army was forced to defend itself." On September 30 the same agency broadcast: "Chinese authorities are using Japanese troops to 'recover lost territories.'"

CONTINUING SEARCH FOR UNITY. Against this background of fierce factionalism, Government and Communist representatives have been negotiating in Chungking since August 28 for an understanding that could lead to Chinese unification. United States officials are hopeful that Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung, the Communist leader, are making real progress toward agreement, but the same hope has been burning with irregular brightness for almost two years. In order to support its position in the negotiations, each faction is displaying its military strength. The Central Government, besides skirmishing with the Communists in isolated areas, on October 3 forced Lung Yun, a once powerful war lord, from his governorship of Yunnan. In spite of the military displays and clashes, however, China is not yet torn by civil war.

If the Chiang-Mao talks have concrete results, it could be said that the 10 months' tour of Patrick J. Hurley as United States Ambassador to China has been something of a success. But if they fail, the United States may be forced to reconsider the Hurley policy of energetic support of Chungking. Without agreement between Chiang and Mao, the Central Government will be helpless to exert its authority over a large segment of China. Hurley has returned to the United States amid doubt as to whether he will resume his post.

In another effort to bring about unity, the Kuomintang and the Communist party on October 2 concurred in the suggestion that non-party men and representatives of the Chinese Democratic League (a federation of third-party liberal groups) meet to discuss the calling of a political conference on peaceful reconstruction of the country. The Chinese Democratic League, although a small, weak organization, might serve as an agent in bringing together the Kuomintang and the Communists. **BLAIR BOLLES**